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The purpose of the paper is to develop the argument that history of thought and
methodology should form part of the content of pluralist teaching in economics,
where the aim of this teaching is to equip students to exercise their own
judgement as economists.Discussion of the nature and scope of economics,with
examples from history,helps students understand what is involved in considering a
range of approaches and methods (rather than uncritically accepting one general
approach,but without resorting to ‘anything goes’).A way of teaching about the
current crisis is used as an exemplar.
Introduction
In teaching economics,it is important to give students a sense of the discipline.This
includes a feeling for current debate (see eg Dow,2003).Analysing the different
arguments within a debate itself requires some pluralism,ie considering different
approaches to a question.Indeed the pluralist pleas from the French students
which led to the setting up of the Post-Autistic Economics Network and what
became the Real-World Economics Review explicitly called for teaching economics
through teaching about debates in economics (Anonymous,2000).
Discussion of pluralist teaching in economics therefore addresses concerns that
only one general approach is currently emphasised in economics teaching,and that
instead students should be exposed to a range of approaches.Already we are
touching on controversial questions about the nature of our discipline:how far are
economics,and economics teaching,in fact dominated by one approach? What do
we mean by approach? What is the justiﬁcation for considering a range of
approaches? If students are exposed to different approaches,how are they then to
proceed as practising economists? 
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with a complete formal expression of individual behaviour.Similarly the happiness
literature,and even more so the development well-being literature (see Sen,1985),
have highlighted individuals’concern with processes rather than outcomes,which
evades expression in terms of equilibrium outcomes.Depending on the deﬁnition of
economics,these approaches might or might not be included in the subject.
We need to be aware that there is an important asymmetry.By specifying the
bounds on economics,or indeed even going so far as deﬁning economics in terms
of method,the mainstream excludes other approaches which,by that deﬁnition,fall
short.Since these other approaches deﬁne economics more in terms of subject
matter,and allow a range of methods,there is no question for them of excluding
mainstream economics from the discipline of economics.I am not aware of any
heterodox economist ever arguing against orthodox economics on the grounds
that it is not economics.Arguing for or against any one approach to economics is a
totally different matter and is not at all incompatible with recognition of other
approaches against which one’s own approach needs to be justiﬁed.The
non-mainstream approach has been more amenable to methodological pluralism,
understood in this way,than mainstream economics.
If students are to understand recent developments in economics,and indeed learn
about alternative approaches,then a pluralist education must be cast wider than
the different theoretical approaches within the mainstream to include study of
other approaches.It therefore needs to allow for methodological differences.It also
needs to address the question of pluralism itself.Why should we aim to understand
and teach different approaches rather than seek a common approach (monism)?
The issues of debate we have touched on above,and indeed the very notion of
different approaches,are all methodological.To understand what is involved in
studying different approaches,therefore,a pluralist education needs to incorporate
methodological and historical material to raise awareness ﬁrst,and equip students
with the necessary analytical tools second.We explore this argument further in the
next section.
But before we proceed,some clariﬁcation of concepts may be helpful.This is
important since,as we shall see,there is scope for plurality,not only in economic
theory and methodology,but even in understanding of methodology,history of
thought and the deﬁnition of economics itself.First,I will use the term
‘methodology’in the sense of ‘approach’to forming economic knowledge;an
‘approach’involves a particular selection of methods,but also entails a view about
how to build knowledge more generally,about history of thought and about the
subject matter of economics.For some (non-pluralists) methodology simply
involves questions of how to use particular methods.
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The purpose of this paper is to make a speciﬁc recommendation for the content of
pluralist teaching in economics,as a foundation for teaching through debates.It
will be argued that economics teaching should be pluralist also in the sense of
including coverage of the methodology of economics and the history of economic
thought.The questions posed by pluralism are essentially methodological and
therefore require students to be both methodologically aware and
methodologically informed.Further,once attention is paid to different approaches
to economics,we ﬁnd that these are best understood with reference to different
episodes of development in economic thought,as the discipline addressed
particular new concerns.History of thought can thus make a valuable input.
Until the past 50 years,much of economics discourse was pluralist to some degree,
in allowing for consideration of some diversity of views,and also had embedded
within it methodological discussion and reference to history of thought (Blaug,
1999,2000,2003).Indeed we will argue that having the two subjects integral to
discussion in the various ﬁelds of economics would be ideal.However,during a
transitional phase,a separate teaching focus on methodology and history of
thought would probably be necessary.This is because our starting point is a
discipline dominated by the mainstream approach which discourages explicit
study of history of thought and methodology.
In the mainstream,insofar as pluralism is considered,mathematics is seen as the
solution to what is seen as a regrettable plurality,putting all argument on an equal
footing.The mathematical modelling requirement has been understood as a
neutral scientiﬁc requirement for rigour,on the grounds that mathematical
argument translates fairly unproblematically into verbal argument (Krugman,
1998).The form of mathematics used is an application of classical logic,where
propositions are derived logically from axioms taken to be true (ensuring the truth
of the propositions).Where the truth-value of the axioms is open to question,as in
the behavioural economics literature,the express aim is to amend these axioms for
conformity with the evidence,rather than change the structure of argument.
Yet the argument has been made by heterodox economists that mathematics
cannot offer a direct translation of verbal argument,and therefore that
mathematical argument sets its own bounds on the subject matter (Chick and Dow,
2005;Duran,2007).The issue is whether or not a complete argument can be
expressed mathematically,or whether a mathematical argument can only
contribute a partial argument.In particular,individual decision-makers face
knowledge limitations,as highlighted by behavioural economists (particularly ‘old’
behavioural economists,who draw on Herbert Simon;see Sent,2004) as well as Post
Keynesians (Runde and Mizuhara,2003).The resulting uncertainty is not consistentHistory of Thought and Methodology in Pluralist Economics Education
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statements arrived at by means of deductive logic (Caldwell,1982).This provided
the methodological justiﬁcation for deﬁning good economics in terms of general
equilibrium theory which could then be subjected to empirical testing (even if only
‘in principle’;see Hahn,1973).
But empirical testing did not prove to be as decisive in discriminating between
theories as had been expected,for a wide variety of reasons.In spelling out some of
these reasons,Caldwell (1982) made the ﬁrst call for pluralism in economics.Given
that no one approach seemed satisfactory for establishing the best methodological
approach to economics,it would be better to consider a range of different
approaches.This call came as methodology was changing,reﬂecting the changes in
philosophy of science itself.One of the major challenges was to the whole notion of
independent facts as arbiters of theory,without which logical positivism could not
be sustained.Also a more pluralist tendency was emerging in society,promoting
respect for a range of political views,social background,race,religion and gender
(replacing the traditional hierarchical structure).So in social science there was a
growing recognition of different methodological approaches,without any ultimate
set of rules by which to demonstrate which was best,ie pluralism.
Studying economics from this pluralist perspective can beneﬁt from an
understanding of the inﬂuential framework of Thomas Kuhn (1970a,1970b),
although it requires some adaptation to the social sciences.A methodological
approach is like his concept of ‘paradigm’.It is based on a particular understanding
of the subject matter (in the case of economics,how the economy works) and of
the best way to build knowledge about it.Thus,for example,mainstream
economics understands the economy in terms of markets,and seeks to build
knowledge about it in terms of predictable individualistic choice behaviour.The
method employed to that end is mathematical,such that a theory can be fully
represented by a mathematical model.Neo-Austrians share the focus on markets
and individuals,but understand markets as ever-changing,and individual
behaviour as creative,so that neither can be captured adequately in a
mathematical model,nor in macroeconomic analysis,so that the primary method is
the case study.Post Keynesians focus more on the interdependency between the
individual and social levels;mathematical modelling is used to contribute to
argument,but fundamental uncertainty limits the scope for the kind of stable
behaviour which lends itself to modelling,because of the scope for unpredictable
discrete shifts as expectations and conﬁdence in them undergo shifts.
A key element of Kuhn’s framework was that paradigms are ultimately
incommensurate.This follows because,not only are theories different,but even the
meaning of words may be different,reﬂecting different understandings of the
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Second,pluralism is the argument for plurality,and can apply at a range of levels.
Methodological pluralism involves recognition of a plurality of methodologies to
be analysed,and it is this sense of pluralism which will normally be used in what
follows.Practising economists must adopt one methodology or another,but they
can also be methodological pluralists if they recognise that there are other
possibilities,and that there is no absolute set of criteria by which to decide which is
best to the satisfaction of all.The methodology they adopt can be pluralist or not,ie
reliance on many methods or one,respectively.So a pluralist approach to teaching
involves methodological pluralism,while some of the literature being taught may
itself not adopt a pluralist methodology.Similarly,within one methodological
approach being taught there may be a range of theories,ie theoretical plurality.
We proceed by considering the historical development of methodology in order to
understand the different approaches to methodology itself (including attitudes to
pluralism),from which follow the methodological differences which underpin
much of the plurality of theory.We then consider how an integrated use of this kind
of material might work in practice.The case study of teaching about the
explanations for the current ﬁnancial and economic crisis is used as an illustration.
Here students can not only learn about the different explanations for the crisis,but
can also see how different theoretical approaches to money and ﬁnancial market
analysis in the past have themselves inﬂuenced the institutional arrangements and
policy which produced the crisis.
Pluralism,methodology and history of thought
If we are to give an explicit role for teaching the methodology of economics in a
pluralist curriculum,we need to consider further what is involved in
methodological analysis,since here,too,there are different possible approaches.In
particular there are different approaches to pluralism itself.We will therefore start
this section by discussing different approaches to methodology as the ﬁeld has
evolved,and in the process we will discuss how ideas about pluralism have
developed.We will also explore more fully the reasons for the methodological
differences within economics.It will be argued that methodological and historical
understanding is a necessary ingredient in pluralist education.
Some methodological argument in economics harks back to an old approach to
methodology,echoes of which still appear in introductory textbooks,in discussion
among non-methodologists and implicitly in discussion of theory choice.This
traditional methodology (exempliﬁed by Blaug,1980) took the approach of
specifying rules for good science,applied to economics.The dominant inﬂuence
was logical positivism,which deﬁned good science as consisting of testableHistory of Thought and Methodology in Pluralist Economics Education
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acceptance that there is no independent way to decide which approach to adopt,
and the approaches are in many respects incommensurate,this does not mean that
‘anything goes’.It only means that choosing one approach over another is a matter
of judgement,and debate consists of persuasion (in the absence of demonstrable
proof).The choice is not free,in that the way we understand the world is the result
of what Searle (1995),calls ‘deep background’;we are creatures to a considerable
extent of our social and personal circumstances,as well as the education we
receive.But the more we are aware of this,the more we can employ reason in our
choice of approach,and the more constructive is debate.
The importance of rhetoric for persuasion was something well-understood by
Keynes,and now the subject-matter of the rhetoric approach spearheaded by
McCloskey (1983).We choose our approach to economics for good reasons,which
we bring to debate.There also needs to be some commensurability to allow
communication of reasons;that commensurability is provided substantially by a
shared subject matter,even though it (and evidence about it) may be understood
differently,and by shared elements of economics education,even though that
might have employed different approaches.Any one individual who understood
the economy completely differently from everyone else,and whose reasons were
not accepted by anyone else,would not be able to engage in economics discussion
(whether or not the reasons were good in their own terms,or nonsense).Kuhn’s
paradigms were essentially social,referring to shared views within a scientiﬁc
community.He saw progress in science as occurring within these communities,by
the criteria of these communities.Although for the physical sciences Kuhn saw
paradigms as sequential,for the social sciences we can apply his ideas to
contemporaneous paradigms.What emerges in practices,given the
nonindividualistic notion of paradigms,is a pluralism structured around a limited
range of approaches rather than ‘anything goes’(Dow,2004).
The methodology of the dominant approach will tend to colour the structure of
economics education.Some have expressed concern that mainstream economics
education has focused increasingly on mathematical methods,at the expense of
other methods (Colander and Klamer,1987;Krueger et al.,1991).As we have seen,
this characterises the mainstream methodological approach,although the range of
mathematical methods,and of types of evidence,is expanding.
But,while it is argued by some that mathematics is necessary for the development
of argument (Krugman,1998;Backhouse,1998),argument in practice even in the
mainstream draws on a wide range of methods,ie it is pluralist.There is thus a
contrast between the mathematical formalist ‘official discourse’and the plurality of
methods of the ‘unofficial discourse’(McCloskey,1983).Non-mainstream
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economy and the different frameworks developed to analyse it.Equilibrium can be
understood as an abstract requirement of theory,or as a real state of rest,for
example (Chick,2006).A great attraction of mathematics is that it appears to render
arguments commensurate.But the problem is that in the process it changes and
constrains arguments which have been developed deliberately beyond
mathematics.Indeed it is precisely because of this that most non-mainstream
approaches differ from the mainstream exclusive reliance on mathematical models.
What is involved in methodological pluralism,therefore,is studying these different
frameworks,with a view to analysing each in its own terms,and also discussing the
frameworks themselves.But there is no neutral ground;each methodologist,and
each student as methodological observer,has his or her own approach.However,
making that approach explicit at least helps the discussion escape from
ever-recursive reﬂexivity.The reader has a clue as to how to interpret the analysis.
As a result,the bulk of work in methodology now aims as far as possible to describe
and analyse methodologies.As such it provides useful material for students
learning about different approaches to economic theory.
Modern methodology provides the tools for students themselves to understand
what lies behind the kind of debate noted above about the nature and scope of
economics,as well as more specialised debates about how best to analyse a
particular topic.For example,the critique of logical positivism aids the
understanding of the debate between theorists and applied economists in
behavioural ﬁnance.But methodological awareness also helps with debates about
theory and policy,many of which are arguments at cross-purposes because the
underlying methodological differences have been suppressed.
It is through debates between different positions (on methodology,theory or policy)
that students can learn how to develop their own capacity for judgement as
economists.By considering the different approaches as well as the different detailed
arguments,students can prepare themselves for forming their own views.By
stepping outside the asymmetry of the exclusivist mainstream methodology (which
precludes discussion of other approaches as being not-economics),some students
will discover other approaches which accord better with their own understandings
of how the economy works.But for the many who conclude that they prefer the
mainstream approach,understanding why that is the case,and understanding what
is meant by arguments from other approaches,can only strengthen their capacity
for judgement.An understanding of methodology should also engender an
appropriate modesty among economists as to the limitations of our knowledge.
It is important to understand what is involved in this pluralism at the
methodological level,since it is often misunderstood.While it involves anHistory of Thought and Methodology in Pluralist Economics Education
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matter for debate (see for example Weintraub,1999,and Backhouse,2001).
Exploring such debate in itself would contribute to a pluralist education in that it is
relevant also to the interpretation of contemporary literature.
Second,to understand modern economics,with its different approaches,students
need to understand how it became the way it is.If economics is not fully
represented by a set of mathematical models,where meanings are taken to be
uncontentious,then the signiﬁcance of the models and the meanings attached to
them can only be grasped by understanding their history (Blaug,2000).This
involves understanding the motivation of those who developed new ideas,and the
context in which these ideas were taken up and developed.The interview format
arising from the rhetoric approach,and pioneered by Klamer (1984),has helped us
understand the work of leading economists by helping us to understand their
motivation and the background to the different paths their work took.
Third,the formalist mainstream approach has promoted the view that economic
thought represents progress,so that everything we have in modern economics
represents the best of what has been produced in the past.Thus for example Lucas
(1980) represented rational expectations as progress from Keynes’s formulation of
expectations under uncertainty;but the very act of ‘operationalising’uncertainty
eliminated it.Any notion of progress is speciﬁc to one approach to economics
– progress to mainstream economists may be regress to non-mainstream
economists,and vice versa.Once we take a pluralist approach to economics
education,the way is open to study different periods of economic thought in the
terms of those periods.What were the problems of the time? Why were they
studied in that particular way? Are there any ideas from the past which we might
want to revive and adapt to modern circumstances? 
Teaching about the causes of the crisis
We have argued here at a fairly abstract level that methodology and history of
thought should be part of a pluralist education in economics,not only to
understand the different methodologies lying behind different theories,but also to
understand pluralism itself.We now try to tie these arguments down in an
illustration of how this might be done in practice.We take the case of explaining
the current crisis as an excellent example of where important issues are being
raised about what had conventionally been accepted as good theory and policy.
We will see that these issues can be illuminated by drawing on methodology and
history of thought.In particular we will see that plurality applies at the level of how
the crisis is deﬁned and how it is explained,in each case building on the history of
ideas.Indeed questions of theoretical approach have become a matter for public
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approaches which do not accept the exclusivity of mathematical argument employ
a range of other methods in addition in their official discourse.In particular,verbal
argument is understood to allow for different content from mathematical
argument,including in particular discussion of meaning (something which
mathematics suppresses).For some the only logic is classical logic (which lends
itself to formal expression).But others (particularly Keynesians,such as Gerrard,
1992) argue in favour of alternative logics.For example Keynes’s ‘human logic’,
which takes a pluralist approach to knowledge,is appropriate where the truth-
value of premises is uncertain,and the approach lends itself to conceptual as well
as mathematical analysis.
If mathematical argument is insufficient,and other types of argument are required
in addition (a pluralist methodology),then judgement is required in order to arrive
at conclusions (Dow,2004).This is something made explicit by the Bank of England
(1999),when discussing the role of models in monetary policy decision-making.The
nature of judgement is seldom discussed in economics,yet clearly it is critical for
economists in practice,when applying what they have learnt to real-world
situations.It is important therefore that economics education should equip
students by training them in judgement.This requires that the curriculum cover
different types of argumentation and exercises in putting them together in order to
arrive at a coherent conclusion.
In order to even start discussing these things,students need some training in
methodology.It is not that all discussion or teaching should be explicitly
methodological.The point is that without methodological awareness there can be
no recognition of difference of approach,and without methodological training no
conceptual apparatus with which to discuss it.
The arguments for teaching history of economic thought as part of a pluralist
curriculum follow from the argument for teaching methodology.History of thought
can be studied for its own sake,as intellectual history,and indeed it is out of such
detailed archival work that the body of knowledge in history of thought emerges.
But study of this history of thought is also important as part of a pluralist education.
First,once we get away from the idea that there is one best interpretation of past
ideas (as of current ideas),the history of our subject opens up.For example,does
Adam Smith really provide unqualiﬁed authority for free-market economics? Or,
however we regard the political conclusions Marx drew from his analysis of
capitalism,might we not learn from this analysis? Or,does Austrian economics
really provide the foundation for rational expectations (as Kantor 1979 suggests)?
Have ideas been discarded which could now prove useful? How we understand the
history of economic thought in general,and interpret texts in particular,is itself aHistory of Thought and Methodology in Pluralist Economics Education
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efficient markets hypothesis).As bank assets were increasingly securitised and
complex derivatives markets developed,quantitative models became the core
basis for trading,with two of its more successful purveyors (Merton and Scholes)
being awarded the Nobel prize.
But the drawbacks of this methodology had already become evident,for example
in the 1997–98 crisis.The limitation of these models to extrapolating from the past
meant that they were unable to predict the structural shift in market pricing as
perception of risk went through dramatic revisions.But there was no ‘plan B’;the
models had been treated as sufficient.In the current crisis,the underpricing of risk,
and the inability of quantitative models to handle discrete shifts,has again been a
central feature.Yet the institutional structure of markets is built on the pricing of
risk,and the main plank of central bank control,capital adequacy ratios,is also built
on assessment of risk,all in terms of quantitative models which were unable to
predict actual risk in time of crisis.
Teaching about the central role in the crisis of these ‘quants’exposes students to a
methodological discussion which gets to the heart of how we build knowledge in
economics (see eg Dow,2009).Here students can explore a different tradition in the
history of economic thought.Keynes (1936) was concerned precisely with these
matters in the wake of the Great Depression,and drew on his theory of probability
(Keynes,1921) to analyse them.Keynes emphasised that fundamental uncertainty
was the norm,ie conditions under which it was impossible to determine a
quantiﬁed probability.Therefore markets develop practices (conventions) to cope
with uncertainty,normally promoting stability.But since market valuations cannot
be demonstrably correct (the future being fundamentally uncertain),they are
vulnerable to changes in sentiment which can cause discrete shifts in prices.
Minsky (1976,1982) developed Keynes’s ideas into the ﬁnancial instability
hypothesis,which many have drawn on to explain ﬁnancial crisis (see eg Arestis and
Glickman,2002;Kregel,2008;Whalen,2007;Nesvetailova,2007;Wray and Tymoigne,
2008).The theory is built on an understanding of crisis as part of a systemic
instability in capitalist economies which can be moderated but not eliminated.
Minsky showed how,during a boom,market valuations become held with
increasing conﬁdence,encouraging ever-more leveraging,to the point that the
ﬁnancial system becomes increasingly fragile,because it is so vulnerable to
expectations being disappointed.High degrees of leveraging mean that cash ﬂow
is critical to meeting debt commitments.Once perceived risk is thought to be
increasing,the resulting asset price falls lead to asset sales and defaults on loans,
which encourages banks to curtail their lending,further exacerbating the situation.
The real economy is affected by reduced demand,with the result of increased
unemployment.
International Review of Economics Education
50
debate (eg in the pages of the Financial Times).Methodological pluralism is playing
out before us.
Students need to develop awareness that the reality of the crisis itself is open to
different understandings.For commentators on the ﬁnancial sector it is a matter of
the behaviour of some key individuals,about judgements and misjudgements,and
about wild swings in market values.For others outside the ﬁnancial sector the
economic crisis is an occasion for increasing hardship,within those economies
which had contributed to the ﬁnancial crisis,but also spreading to those which had
adopted more prudent ﬁnancial practices,threatening even more the worsening
disparities in incomes worldwide.For policy-makers,the crisis also poses important
questions about conﬁdence in domestic and international institutions.
Students can be shown too that economic theorists have different understandings
of the nature of the crisis,tied into different methodological approaches and
drawing on different historical ideas.
In order ﬁrst for students to understand the theoretical and institutional frameworks
within which the crisis arose,they need to be taught about the legacy of 1980s
monetarism,with its logical positivist methodological approach.First New Classical
monetary theory (see eg Lucas,1981),then New Keynesian monetary theory (see eg
Woodford 2003),treated the real economy and money-and-prices separately.Central
banks could thus be charged with the primary goal of controlling inﬂation,while
governments were concerned with real variables.This encouraged the practice of
making central banks independent of government,charged with pursuing inﬂation
targets.This practise was explicit,for example,in the conditions for European Monetary
Union.At the same time,bank regulation and supervision became regarded as a
micro-concern,detached from inﬂation targeting,and thus administered increasingly
by bodies separate from the central bank.The theoretical framework had encouraged
an institutional framework which proved to be highly signiﬁcant as the crisis
developed,in that it impeded both recognition of the seriousness of the situation and
also the capacitytoaddress it as effectively as possible.
Students can also be shown that the market conditions which led to the crisis can
also be understood in terms of this theoretical framework and its underlying
methodological framework which gave primacy to mathematical modelling as
being capable of encompassing the complete picture (within known stochastic
variation),not only of the economy (for monetary policy purposes),but also of
markets.This approach reached its apex in the ﬁeld of ﬁnance,where markets were
regarded as being as close as possible to the perfect markets of theory.The
foundation of this approach is that there is a ‘correct’measure of risk (based on the
capital asset pricing model),which is embodied in market prices (according to theHistory of Thought and Methodology in Pluralist Economics Education
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aberration,lead to quite different explanations.In turn,a methodological approach
predisposes economists to understand the crisis in these different ways.Students
can also be shown how the reality itself can be shaped by the implementation of
theories,not only in policy but in institutional design.We can look to the history of
economic thought in Niebyl’s (1946) history of monetary theory for an enlightening
discussion of how reality,ideas,institutional arrangements and policy impact on
each other.But they can get seriously out of phase,such that ideas encouraged by
one set of circumstances eventually become embedded in a new institutional
structure which delimits subsequent monetary policy,which may be quite
inappropriate to new circumstances.Students then need to get a sense,not only of
how banking and central banking have evolved,but also of how the theory of
monetary policy has evolved and led to particular institutional arrangements and
policy stances.A particularly fruitful framework has been developed by Chick (1986;
1988;1993) for analysing the development of banking systems,and the theory of
monetary policy appropriate to the different stages,through history.The analysis
has been updated to apply to the current crisis (Chick,2008).
In conclusion,in teaching the material covered in this section,students can be
shown that the crisis raises key methodological issues about market pricing and
behaviour in ﬁnancial markets (and indeed in any market),and the nature of the
knowledge base.These issues apply also to how we theorise about economic
behaviour,and therefore about the knowledge base of economics more generally.
How we resolve these questions (which will differ depending on our
methodological approach) will determine how we understand markets,and
formulate policy.Analysis of the crisis at a methodological level also helps students
understand the nature of the different analyses on offer,and the source of much of
the debate about how to proceed.We have also seen how each of the different
approaches on offer has drawn on different traditions in the history of thought.
How to proceed
We have argued here for promotion of methodological awareness as a central part
of pluralist teaching in economics.But dealing with methodological issues poses a
particular challenge when students are new to this kind of teaching.When the
impression has been created that there is only one legitimate approach to
economics (within which there may be differences of theory and method,but not
methodology),it is hard to get across a methodologically-pluralist approach.There
is therefore a question of managing the transition to pluralist teaching;indeed the
transition may be equally important for teachers themselves who are not
accustomed to a pluralist approach to economics education.
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But students can be shown how a very different explanation arises when the crisis
is seen,not as part of a normal instability,but as an aberration from the norm.A
different and highly inﬂuential explanation of the crisis comes from the New
Keynesian tradition,within the mainstream so still with optimising agents,but
subject to market imperfections.This approach focuses on knowledge issues,
stressing the role of asymmetric information.Their critique of the efficient markets
hypothesis is based on the idea that market players have different information sets
on which they base their price expectations and risk assessments (see eg Furman
and Stiglitz,1998).Indeed this focus on knowledge lay behind the dominant
explanation for the South-East Asia crisis,and led to the IMF emphasis on
improving governance in South-East Asian banking,and thus improving
information ﬂows (see further Stiglitz,2002,who inspired this ‘Post Washington
Consensus’).It is still maintained that,even if only in principle,there is a correct
measure of risk which can be incorporated in asset prices.
Students could be asked to consider,as just one example of the current literature,
Calomiris’s (2008) comparison of analyses of the current crisis,presented at an IMF
conference in November 2008.His own New Keynesian approach analyses the
origins of the crisis in underpricing of risk due to a combination of such factors as
asymmetric information,market imperfections arising from government
involvement in ﬁnancial markets,agency problems and poor governance.He
regards as inadequate the New Classical (‘fundamentalist’) focus on the need for a
correction back to trend from the long market rise which these factors had caused,
on the grounds that this does not explain the initial deviation from trend in this
particular case.Similarly he rejects the Minsky explanation because it relies on
‘irrational myopia’without supplying a universal theory of human behaviour which
can explain why risk is underpriced at some times and overpriced at others,and to
differing degrees.
But then it can be shown to students that Minsky is here being interpreted within
the New Keynesian approach,which (like the ‘fundamentalist’approach) presumes
a rational objective risk measurement benchmark with respect to which the market
may underprice or overprice.From the Post Keynesian perspective,Minsky is
arguing rather that,in the absence of such an objective benchmark,markets value
risk as best they can.The dynamic of rising markets reduces the perception of risk,
while that of falling markets increases it,but not in such a way that timing and
degree can be forecast quantitatively.In these different ways of understanding
what is happening,we have a clear example of the signiﬁcance of the
methodological framework within which we consider competing explanations.
More generally this type of analysis helps students see how different
understandings of what the crisis means,and whether it is systemic or anHistory of Thought and Methodology in Pluralist Economics Education
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Conclusion
The argument for pluralism is a methodological one,itself requiring reference to
history of thought.But what I have argued here is that methodology and history of
thought should themselves be an integral part of pluralist teaching in economics.
We are only in the position of having to consider such questions because the non-
pluralist development of mainstream economics takes its methodological
approach as given (and thus an arbiter of quality in the discipline) and makes scant
reference to history of thought.Once a pluralist approach to teaching economics is
established,methodology and history of thought would be such a natural part of
the discourse that we would cease to regard them as separable specialisms.They
would become part and parcel of how we teach economics.
Notes
* I am grateful to Victoria Chick and anonymous referees for helpful comments.
References
Anonymous (2000) ‘Student Petition of Autisme-Economie’(English translation).
Retrieved September 2009 from http://www.paecon.net/PAEtexts/a-e-petition.htm
Arestis,P.and Glickman,M.(2002) ‘Financial crisis in Southeast Asia:dispelling illusion the
Minskyan way’,Cambridge Journal of Economics,vol.26,pp.237–60.
Backhouse,R.E.(1998) ‘If mathematics is informal,then perhaps we should accept that
economics must be informal too’,Economic Journal,vol.108(451),pp.1848–58.
Backhouse,R.E.(2001) ‘How and Why Should We Write the History of Twentieth-Century
Economics?’,Journal of the History of Economic Thought,vol.23,pp.243–51.
Bank of England (1999) Economic Models at the Bank of England.London:Bank of
England.
Blaug,M.(1980) The Methodology of Economics.Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,
second edition 2002.
Blaug,M.(1999) ‘The Formalist Revolution or What Happened to Orthodox Economics
After World War II?’in:R.E.Backhouse and J.Creedy (eds.) From Classical Economics to the
Theory of the Firm:Essays in Honour of D.P.O’Brien.Cheltenham:Edward Elgar,pp.257–80.
Blaug,M.(2000) ‘No History of Ideas,Please,We’re Economists’,Journal of Economic
Perspectives,vol.14(1),pp.145–64.
Blaug,M.(2003) ‘The Formalist Revolution of the 1950s’in:W.J.Samuels,et al.(eds),A
Companion to the History of Economic Thought.Malden,MA and Oxford,UK:Blackwell,pp.
395–410.
Caldwell,B.J.(1982) Beyond Positivism:Economic Methodology in the Twentieth Century.
London:Allen & Unwin.
Calomiris,C.W.(2008) ‘The Subprime Turmoil:What’s Old,What’s New,What’s Next’,
Annual Jacques Polak Conference,IMF,November.
Chick,V.(1986/1992) ‘The Evolution of the Banking System and the Theory of Saving,
Investment and Interest’,Economies et Sociétés,série Monnaie et Production no.3,pp.
111–26,reprinted in:P.Arestis and S.C.Dow (eds) OnMoney,Methodand Keynes.London:
Macmillan.
International Review of Economics Education
54
I would suggest an initial exercise which I have found effective in managing the
transition.I use this exercise for students embarking on a course in history of
thought and methodology,but it could equally be used more generally in a pluralist
economics course where students have been accustomed to monist teaching.The
critical step for students to take,and one which is difficult for many to contemplate,
is for them to accept that they can legitimately express opinions about economics
(not just about the choice between this or that model;see Earl,2000).
The exercise is to ask them to choose any piece of writing in economics which has
struck them for some reason.It may be particularly persuasive,or particularly
repellent;it may be intriguing,or well-written,or just interesting.Students are asked
to write a page explaining why they chose that piece,and be prepared to present it
to the group,who may have differing opinions.Some students grasp the exercise
quickly,particularly if they have had prior experience of methodological pluralism.
But for many it is a struggle to understand that they can legitimately form their
own opinions.However,my experience has been that,once that understanding is
achieved,there is no looking back.There is no problem thereafter encouraging
class discussion,and students put great effort into written work.In the process of
the pluralist education which follows,students learn how to develop their own
capacity to judge issues and to understand the basis for their judgements.As a
result,students become equipped to choose their own approach and address
alternatives as they become practising economists.
The transition to incorporating history of thought and methodology into pluralist
teaching may require some initial specialist teaching of the history of economic
thought and methodology to provide some background for applying them to
particular ﬁelds,like monetary/macroeconomics as above.These introductory
courses could be supplemented by specialist history of thought and methodology
courses for those with a special interest in them.But the main priority should be to
equip all students to approach economics with an awareness of methodology,and
the scope for methodological difference,and with a basic knowledge of the history
of their subject (with its different methodological approaches).Ideally,
methodology and history of thought are most effective when woven into
economic teaching as the best way to understand a ﬁeld and the debates within it.
Indeed this is the political economy tradition;history of thought and methodology
only became specialist ﬁelds,separated from the rest of the discipline,when
economics came to be taught largely without any reference to them.History of Thought and Methodology in Pluralist Economics Education
57
Krueger,A.O.et al.(1991) ‘Report of the Commission on Graduate Education in
Economics’,Journal of Economic Literature,vol.29,pp.1035–53.
Krugman,P.(1998) ‘Two Cheers for Formalism’,Economic Journal,vol.108(451),pp.
1829–36.
Kuhn,T.S.(1970a) The Structure of Scientiﬁc Revolutions,second edition.Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Kuhn,T.S.(1970b) ‘Reﬂections on My Critics’in:I.Lakatos and A.Musgrave (eds) Criticism
and the Growth of Knowledge.Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.
Lucas,R.E.,Jr (1980) ‘Methods and Problems in Business Cycle Theory’,Journal of Money
Credit and Banking,vol.12,pp.696–715.
Lucas,R.E.,Jr (1981) Studies in Business Cycle Theory.Oxford:Blackwell.
McCloskey,D.N.(1983) ‘The Rhetoric of Economics’,Journal of Economic Literature vol.21,
pp.434–61.
Minsky,H.P.(1976) John Maynard Keynes.London:Macmillan.
Minsky,H.P.(1982) Inﬂation,Recession and Economic Policy,Brighton:Wheatsheaf.
Nesvetailova,A.(2007) Fragile Finance.London:Palgrave.
Niebyl,K.H.(1946) Studies in the Classical Theories of Money.New York:Columbia
University Press.
Runde,J.and Mizuhara,S.(eds) (2003) The Philosophy of Keynes’s Economics:probability,
uncertainty and convention.London:Routledge.
Searle,J.(1995) The Construction of Social Reality.New York:Free Press.
Sen,A.(1985) Commodities and Capabilities.Amsterdam:North-Holland.
Sent,E.-M.(2004) ‘Behavioural Economics:How Psychology Made Its (Limited) Way Back
into Economics’,Historyof Political Economy,vol.36(4),pp.735–60.
Stiglitz,J.E.(2002) Globalization and its Discontents.London:Allen Lane.
Weintraub,E.R.(1999) ‘How Should We Write the History of Twentieth-Century
Economics?’,Oxford Review of Economic Policy,vol.15,pp.139–52.
Whalen,C.J.(2007) The US Credit Crunch of 2007:A Minsky Moment,Levy Institute Public
Policy Brief No.92.
Woodford,M.(2003) Interest and Prices:Foundations of a Theory of Monetary Policy.
Princeton:Princeton University Press.
Wray,L.R.and Tymoigne,E.(2008) ‘Macroeconomics Meets Hyman P.Minsky:The









International Review of Economics Education
56
Chick,V.(1988) ‘Sources of Finance,Recent Changes in Bank Behaviour and the Theory of
Investment and Saving’in:P.Arestis (ed.),Contemporary Issues in Money and Banking:
Essays in Honour of Stephen Frowen.London:Macmillan,pp.30–48.
Chick,V.(1993) ‘The Evolution of the Banking System and the Theory of Monetary Policy’
in:S.F.Frowen (ed.),Monetary Theory and Monetary Policy:New Tracks for the 1990s.
London:Macmillan,pp.79–92.
Chick,V.(2006) ‘Equilibrium in Economics:Some Concepts and Controversies’in:V.Mosini
(ed.) Equilibrium in Economics.London:Routledge.
Chick,V.(2008) ‘Could the Crisis at Northern Rock have been Predicted?:An Evolutionary
Approach’,Contributions to Political Economy,vol.2,pp.1–12.
Chick,V.and Dow,S.C.(2005) ‘The Meaning of Open Systems’,Journal of Economic
Methodology,vol.12(3),pp.363–81.
Colander,D.,and Klamer,A.(1987) ‘The Making of an Economist’,Journal of Economic
Perspectives,vol.1,pp.825–43.
Dow,S.C.(2003) ‘The Relevance of Controversies for Practice as well as Teaching’in:E.
Fullbrook (ed.),The Crisis in Economics:The Post-Autistic Economics Movement:The ﬁrst 600
days.London:Routledge.
Dow,S.C.(2004) ‘Structured Pluralism’,Journal of Economic Methodology,vol.11(3),pp.
275–90.
Dow,S.C.(2009) ‘The Psychology of Financial Markets:Keynes,Minsky and Emotional
Finance’in:D.B.Papadimitriou and L.R.Wray (eds),The Elgar Companion to Hyman Minsky.
Cheltenham:Elgar,forthcoming.
Duran,M.(2007) ‘Mathematical Needs and Economic Interpretations’,Contributions to
Political Economy,vol.26,pp.1–16.
Earl,P.E.(2000) ‘Indeterminacy in the Economics Classroom’in:P.E.Earl and S.F.Frowen
(eds) Economics as an Art of Thought:Essays in Memory of G.L.S.Shackle.London:
Routledge.
Furman,J.and Stiglitz,J.E.(1998) ‘Economic Crises:Evidence and Insights from East 
Asia’,Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,vol.2,pp.1–135.
Gerrard,B.(1992) ‘Human Logic in Keynes’s Thought:Escape from the Cartesian Vice’in:P.
Arestis and V.Chick (eds) Recent Developments in Post-Keynesian Economics.Aldershot:
Edward Elgar,pp.1–16.
Hahn,F.H.(1973) ‘The Winter of our Discontent’,Economica vol.40,pp.322–30.
Kantor,B.(1979) ‘Rational expectations and Economic Thought’,Journal of Economic
Literature,vol.17,pp.1422–41.
Keynes,J.M.([1921] 1973) ATreatise on Probability.Collected Writings of John Maynard
KeynesVol.VIII.London:Macmillan.
Keynes,J.M.([1936] 1973) The General Theory of Employment,Interest and Money.Collected
Writings of John Maynard KeynesVol.VII.London:Macmillan.
Klamer,A.(1984) Conversations with Economists:New Classical Economists and Their
Opponents Speak Out on the Current Controversy in Macroeconomics.Totowa,NJ:Rowman
and Littleﬁeld.
Kregel,J.(2008) ‘Minsky’s Cushions of Safety:Systemic Risk and the Crisis in the U.S.
Subprime Mortgage Market’,Levy Institute Public Policy Brief No.93A.